窮小子冷眼輯

【全文暨結論】

【網友陳伊力的納悶】【新模式國家後備動員機制】

POSTED BY 台灣窮小子
MR.PRESIDENT OF TAIWAN 蔡英文之首席真命天子
THIRD , FEBRUARY , 2018
31 , JANUARY , 2018
 

本份報告-新模式國家後備動員機制所陳述的觀點,僅是台灣總統 蔡英文之真命天子的觀點;國家後備武力是公開的,左翼民兵是笨蛋!
今天,主題是新模式國家後備動員機制,做為台灣安全武力的未來;當前的台灣左翼份子,討論各個方面困擾台灣的許多危機,或如左翼民兵;但對於台灣是否能夠克服這類危機,並建立政治穩定的獨立與自由,這不是一類看法!
台灣窮小子指出左翼歷史與文化的政經變革,基本上是失敗的;我能夠合理地擔憂台灣的軍事武力,進一步解體,接下來是政治與經濟架構!
代表台灣的國民黨與民進黨,長期忽略國家後備動員機制,這表明台灣早已經在過去二十年中失去軍事優勢;台灣窮小子說明:台灣軍隊未來的願景~~~
我的想法是在合理的戰略環境下,考慮到包括國家後備動員機制在內的台灣境內政經環境,獨立與自由的進一步發展,終結左翼歷史與文化!
我們應該設法建立新模式夥伴關係在後備武力;這類關係的安全特點,才是最終型態的國家軍力完整的元素!
出於這個理由,國家後備動員機制對台灣軍隊有非常重要的意義;左翼民兵的定義是含糊不清的!
簡單來說,左翼民兵對於國家軍隊這樣一個優勢組織來說,無法立即反應任何嚴重性改變;另一方面,左翼歷史與文化無法持續;沒有後備武力就不可能預測軍事力量的演變,至少,在技術與經濟背景,以及相對性軍事平衡!
因此,在說到台灣軍隊的願景時,大概在未來二十年~~~重整國家後備動員機制,這才是現實的!
它考量到可能重新組合的主要台灣人夥伴,並提供時間來操作武器部署;因此,在未來二十年的時間框架,未來的後備武力發展趨勢,才會充分地加入到現實的部署,而無須進入左翼歷史與文化世界!
這是實現台灣與主要軍事與經濟發展的適當狀態;所以,當前的策略選項,將會影響未來二十年的發展!
特別是在這類進程中,將會發生事情,與將會如何確認台灣軍隊;是以在這個時間框架,國家後備動員機制都是軍事變革概念的元素之一,比左翼民兵這類狹隘的理念更大!
【二】【當前台灣的左翼民兵】
當前台灣的左翼民兵
當前台灣民進黨政府,行政機構官僚混亂的狀況,已經對國家防衛部署,造成巨大的負面影響;在左翼歷史與文化放棄自由經濟,從獨立的政治機制,向社會主義,或是共產主義的背景下,這是一個非常危險的發展!
在左翼歷史與文化武裝力量,強制改變,或導致國家思想,政治,戰略,經濟與人口等各類背景下;這讓國家軍事力量幾乎全靠左翼歷史與文化!
當前台灣民進黨政府的軍事戰略基本性不足,大幅放鬆左翼歷史與文化管理;而且,這類左翼歷史與文化控制的缺失,造成不當管理與巨大的混亂,打亂迫切需要的軍事變革!
這給台灣軍隊造成巨大的災難,妨礙部隊調動,降低防衛轉型,惡化軍隊人事機制,給台灣軍官帶來破壞性影響;左翼民兵缺乏國家安全理念,只有透過傳統的軍事訓練與觀念來適應新模式國家後備動員條件!
換句話說,台灣軍隊與參謀本部應該強化國家戰略與學理,部署模式,兵員任務;而不是左翼民兵犧牲訓練與戰備,另言之執行國家安全任務的能力不足!
在體制上,台灣軍隊與其他國家不同;只會保留歷史與文化,忽略傳統性台灣人的戰略角色,同時,不承認作戰任務與戰爭環境的現實;因此,左翼歷史與文化的自我保護決定左翼民兵的架構與部署;主要的因素是奪權!
所以,國家軍事戰略驅動威脅評估;透過威脅評估來建立國家後備動員機制部署與架構;在一定程度上,不論是軍人或是民眾,必須受制於這類動員性行為;但在台灣,不確定性左翼歷史與文化發生國內普遍混亂的安全環境,已經上升到高標準!
近年來台,灣前總統 陳水扁對台灣沒有左右翼的膚淺宣言,讓台灣軍隊陷入窘境;那台灣軍隊是否要做備戰?
如果是這樣,那這就是國家後備動員機制存在的理由;另言之,我們不求戰,也不怕戰!
台灣高層政軍領導人不能從左翼歷史與文化做出選擇,從而破壞我們全面性防衛能力;左翼歷史與文化官僚從來不願意承擔風險!
所以,做出困難的決定與選擇,意味著必須由堅定的高層政軍領導人來強化!
依據新的軍事戰略學理左翼民兵是很複雜的;是以我們要為未來的戰爭做好準備;台灣人部隊必須準備與夥伴一起作戰.或是單獨作戰;像左翼民兵歷史與文化游擊隊.同樣狡猾地攻擊我們;如果,有必要,準備有效地反擊;如果,我們的後備動員武力能夠強大?
因此,台灣後備動員武力必須準備好反擊對台灣國土的任何左翼民兵入侵,並且,在需要時,能夠進行軍事干預!
【三】【當前台灣的左翼民兵】
即使左翼民兵不再對台灣構成威脅,但是,我們的軍事要求應該擁有重大戰爭的應變部署;我只能設定,台灣的政軍領導人應該以相同模式對付左翼民兵!
無論如何,台灣人夥伴必須錯過左翼民兵威脅,或如都會錯過紅色中國威脅;由於它們擁有巨大的顛覆能力,所以,只有對付最壞的狀況才是局面!
即使它們今天不是敵人,但是,很容易變成明天的敵人;對台灣來說,這類最壞的狀況就是被認為左翼民兵支持台灣的附屬力量!
國家防衛武力是要考慮到軍事能力,而不是歷史與文化意圖;因為軍事能力需要多年才能成功,然而,歷史與文化意圖能夠在一夜之間改變!
我相信台灣人同意動員機制這個戰略理念,儘管他們不那麼坦率!
因此,對於過去二十年,台灣政治上發生許多戲劇性改變;但是,基本模式並沒有發生什麼改變!
換句話說,嚴重影響台灣的因素,包括處於危機之中的左翼經濟學態勢;事實上,國家後備動員機制在台灣已經有很長的時間;另言之,台灣的防衛態勢受到左翼歷史與文化的影響!
由於當前與可預期的勢力均衡,台灣不可能對中國軍事力量構成嚴重挑戰!
讓人害怕的是在復活的左翼歷史與文化行動中,台灣只能依靠左翼民兵來抵銷這類恐怖的不平衡;左翼民兵力量不能達到最低限度的防衛能力;另一方面,台灣沒有考慮軍事力量,能夠維持當前傳統兵力的部署!
事實是,中國可能發展成為一類威脅,在很大程度上,取決於台灣的軍事變革;這也決定在台灣的未來與台灣人夥伴關係!
最後是,在未來八年,當前的台灣還是左翼歷史與文化官僚慣性與缺乏終結歷史的結果;台灣的後備軍力在質量上還是很大,但是,在左翼歷史與文化繼續惡化的狀況下,也是面對解體!
幸運的是,台灣沒有中國威脅,而是來自左翼歷史與文化的威脅;因此,當左翼民兵的威脅出現時,台灣將不得不面對這類威脅;因為這類威脅是來自左翼歷史與文化的部隊來完成;或如中國境內民兵!
在左翼歷史與文化,台灣軍隊看起來像八零年代中國解放軍;左翼民兵缺乏訓練與機動性;左翼民兵缺乏科學與技術,將會惡化強大的台灣國防工業;左翼民兵將無法防衛台灣免受威脅!
事實上,這將對台灣的國家安全與國土安全的重大挑戰與威脅;這將是一個非常恐怖的可能性!
【四】【台灣的國土安全環境】
台灣的國土安全環境
台灣-長期以來,缺乏安全政策,忽略現實的安全框架;其實,至少在未來二十年內,台灣對境內安全的關切,將由國家後備動員機制的巨大變革來決定!
左翼歷史與文化必須解體;或是中國早已經失去它的夥伴關係,包括十四億中國人;即使是中國境內,也開始分裂境內左翼民兵就是證明!
長期以來,左翼歷史與文化僅是象徵性;但是,台灣的安全理念,意識形態,與鄉土價值與中國是不同款;有時,甚至是截然相反的!
左翼歷史與文化的政軍平行是很危險的~~~不清楚,不穩定,也無法預測的;是以台灣應該減少左翼歷史與文化讓國家處於一個全新的環境中!
現在台灣的政治,社會與經濟不穩定程度很高;許多台灣人仍然接受左翼歷史與文化,如笨蛋的左翼民兵!
另言之,當國家面對境內緊張狀態,有可能爆發武裝衝突;台灣正在經歷一場左翼歷史與文化的社會與經濟危機,這場危機的結果是無可預期的!
財政危機,產業優勢下降,台灣人才大量流失,讓台灣依靠在中國;但是,台灣仍然是一個強大的力量~~~巨大的台灣人夥伴資源,穩固的工業基礎,與鄉土地位的歷史遺產;所有這一切確保台灣地位高於當前的左翼歷史與文化地位!
台灣仍然擁有區域軍事優勢之一;台灣在傳統性陸軍,空軍與海軍方面仍然是擁有強大的軍事力量!
平心而論,過去幾年以來,台灣的軍事平衡早已經發生改變,忽略左翼歷史與文化改變的特性;台灣可能不是被中國所接收,而是被真正的左翼歷史與文化所取代!
換句話說,左翼歷史與文化的國家應該被終結!
如果,台灣能夠終結左翼歷史與文化,並正確定義後備動員機制在新的國家防衛關係,那麼台灣將繼續擁有國家軍事力量;至少,能夠想像在二十年內,新的後備動員機制將可能導致新的軍事力量!
左翼民兵不太可能成為國土安全的防衛力量!
一個真正的台灣羊群將會存在!
總之,台灣將面對與擁有相當大的國家軍事力量與夥伴關係!
左翼民兵可能會單獨或是以某種模式為台灣挑釁安全問題;這類威脅可能是直接的~~~透過它們支持的左翼歷史與文化,政策,或是運動來對付台灣,特別是中國;另一種可能性是左翼民兵將支持像中國政府那款的歷史與文化活動;台灣的愛國同心會與統一促進黨就是如此!
是以台灣應該維持對這類潛在性左翼民兵,明確的傳統軍事與後備動員優勢;如果這類傳統軍事與後備動員優勢無法有效實現台灣的國家目標;那就意味著錯誤的策略部署與濫用軍事權力!
另一方面左翼民兵得到中國政府的支持,那衝突將會升級;從而在全球區域內挑戰美國的軍事力量!
在東亞,中國將可能對美國構成威脅,包括台灣;所以,左翼民兵是一個範例,特別是中國支持!
是以台灣應該維持戰術與戰略優勢現狀;因此,台灣蔡英文政府至少要擁有抑制這類假想敵左翼民兵威脅出現的有效戰術部署!

【結論】

未來台灣的防衛目標
左翼民兵沒有詳細的說明
有鑑於當前與未來的狀況,需要大規模重新佈署,或是重組國家安全軍力,以面對國家安全與國土安全環境,特別是國家經濟的挑戰!
如果,台灣要擁有新的安全承諾,就需要驅動新模式國家軍事戰略;左翼民兵,違背有效的傳統性戰略優先原則,也不符合新的政治與戰略現實的選項!
傳統上,最集中部署的中華民國武力,必須成為台灣後備動員的主要來源;事實上,台灣的政治領導者應該要明確命令軍方-不能夠左轉,因為台灣沒有本錢進行任何傳統性戰爭!
唯一的例外應該承諾足夠的反擊能力,以提供嚇阻;台灣既不面對來自中國的威脅,也不應該造成對台灣人夥伴的威脅;另言之,台灣需要維持強大力量的現狀!
台灣未來的穩定與安全的最佳希望就是維持非攻擊性軍事能力的現狀,追求不左轉,並與中國保持良好的夥伴關係;而且,如果台灣不會與左翼歷史與文化,經濟學,保持一致性,那符合每個台灣人的利益都是最佳的!
中華民國軍隊的主要駐地是台灣,金門,馬祖,東沙島與太平島!
台灣的國土防衛,既不需要外國,也不需要部署大規模部隊;現役部隊與後備動員武力以反應快速部署的反擊單位就夠了!
由於左翼歷史與文化,經濟學,長期的唬爛與脆弱性,最終將需要在台灣地區永久部署後備動員武力;這幾乎不會像七八零年代在台灣部署六十萬大軍那麼多,另言之,相當於兩個後備軍力單位就足夠了!
就數字來說,台灣現役部隊兵員大概維持在三十萬人;三十萬兵員的力量可能是現實與可靠的部署,到這個時候,台灣應該擁有一個職業精兵,其實,台灣能夠維持三十萬精兵與後備動員武力!
當前的政治,經濟與社會挑戰所面對的主要困難是如何從我們的軍事定位到我們應該擁有的定位,我們的目標是加速攆掉左翼歷史與文化,謊話經濟學,在未來二十年內,獲得雖然小,旦是最佳的台灣羊群力量!
台灣也必須維持當前國家科學與技術的核心現狀,以確保台灣能夠對付未來可能出現無可預期與未知的挑戰!
特別是中華民國的高階軍官不是最好的軍官,而是缺乏台灣人夥伴軍官,士官與兵員;是以我們需要一個新模式國家後備動員機制來重新培訓新世代軍官!
當然,這樣做法與左翼歷史與文化背道而馳,但是,符合台灣傳統與價值;只有堅定與有力的現役部隊與後備動員武力,才能面對挑戰!
陸軍部隊僅維持快速部署現狀;換句話說,三個重型與三個輕裝單位就夠了,如果出現左翼民兵的威脅,則聯合警察,憲兵等其他單位,在平時,大部份是士官!
海軍的使命是,基本上是防衛性,特別是擁有保護國土海洋任務的潛艦艦隊,格外是海上交通線!
總之,台灣部隊必須有能力快速重新鎖定,以便能夠防衛左翼暴力歷史與文化極端主義與恐怖主義!
台灣人夥伴是死不了的神主牌,我們的新戰略與新學理,應該放在現役部隊與後備動員作戰!
新的後備動員武力將是一個像夥伴一樣戰爭的部署!
這應該足以對付左翼暴力歷史與文化極端主義與恐怖主義!
另言之,台灣部隊需要終結歷史的創新與特殊!
這將是獨一無二的台灣國防武力在面對台灣的獨立與民主政治制度與自由經濟的同時,能夠防衛台灣,這個國家免受潛在性威脅!

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【NEW MODEL OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE MOBILIZATION MECHANISM】 
POSTED BY 台灣窮小子
MR.PRESIDENT OF TAIWAN 蔡英文之首席真命天子
THIRD , FEBRUARY , 2018
31 , JANUARY , 2018
This views of expressed in this report - the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism are the author of Mr.President of Taiwan , Tsai Ing-wen's son of the destiny ; the National Reserve Force is for public , and Left-wing's militia is stupid.
Today's the topic of which is Taiwan's secure force as the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism. 
The current Taiwanese Leftists discussed various aspects of the many crises besetting Taiwan ,such as  Left-wing's militia , and there were not views on whether Taiwan would be able to get over those crises and establish a politically stable freedom and independence.
In my remarks , I stated that political and economic reform of Left-wing's history and culture has fundamentally failed , so that I might reasonably fear further collapse in the Taiwanese military force , and the next , political and economic frameworks.
The very fact that Taiwan's KMT and DPP parties were overlooking the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism , in longer term , and that indicate the Taiwan has already lost military superiority in the past of two decades.
I outline a vision for the future of the Taiwanese military force that my idea is set within a well-reasoned strategic context and takes into consideration of the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism in Taiwan's domestic political and economic environment , independence and freedom and the further development of end of history and culture.
We should be working to build new model of partnership in the Reserve Force.
The security dimensions of that relationship remains integral to ultimate National Military Force shape.
For that reason , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism has most significant implications for Taiwanese military force.
The very title of Left-wing's militia is quite ambiguous. 
Put simply , Left-wing's militia would not be able to rapidly respond any serious change in superior organization like the National military force.
On the other hand , Left-wing's history and culture would not continued , and without Reserve Force is impossible to predict the evolution of military force , at least , revolutionary shifts in the technologies and economics contexts , and the relative military balance.
Therefore , in taliking the prospects for Taiwanese military forces , it approximates realistic to the future 20 years - re-integrates the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism.
It thinks consideration of the possible realignment of principal Taiwanese partners , and it provides time to operate weapons deployments.
Accordingly , with a timeframe of 20 years , future trends of Reserve Forces are remaining sufficiently added in reality of deployments , without entering the world of Left-wing's history and culture.
This is an appropriate sitiation for the fulfillment of economic and military development in Taiwan.
So the current strategic options will obviously affect developments in 20 years of the future.
In particular , what happens in that process will define how the Taiwanese military force.
Within this temporal framework , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism are one of elements of the comprehensive notion of military reform , and bigger than the narrow notion of Left-wing's militia.
【2】【Current absurities in Taiwanese Left-wing's militia】
Current absurities in Taiwanese Left-wing's militia.
The current chaotic - bureaucracies situation of the administrative structures in the Taiwan's DPP government have brought about the enormous negative effect on the National Defense Deployments.
This is a particularly dangerous development when taken against the background of socialismn, or communism , from Left-wing's history and culture give up the free economy and from independent political mechanism.
Left-wing's history and culture have left the National military forces virtually on their own , or leading forced change within the National military forces in their Nation of ideological , political , strategic , economic , and demographic contexts.
The fundamental deficiency in the current military strategy and Left-wing's history adn culture are a great relaxation in Taiwan's DPP government.
In addition , this lack of Left-wing's history and culture control have mismanagement and enormous chaos , and has disarranged much needed military reform.
It has created enormous disasters for the Taiwanese military by preventing redeployment of forces , reducing defense conversion , worsening the military personnel system , and hastily affecting Taiwan for most of its officers.
Left-wing's militia lacks of the National security concept , only the model of the National Reserve Mobilization condition has been adapted by traditional military trainings and concepts.
In other words , The military forces and the departments of the Taiwanese General Staff should intensify the National stratgies and doctrines , the models of deployment , personnel missions , rather than Left-wing's militia has come at the expense of readiness and training , in turn , their ability to execute missions warranted by the National security is scant.
Institutionally , Taiwanese military are different than other countries , only keep history and culture , overlook as Taiwanese people of our traditional strategic roles , while not allow to the realities of the operational missions amd the war environment. 
Hense , the self-preservation of Left-wing's history and culture determine for Left-wing's militia framework and deployment , with the primary condition being taken over power.
So National military strategy pushes the threat assessment. 
Through with threat assessments establishing the National Reserve Mobilization , deployment , and mechanism.
To some extent , whatever military as well as civilian , must be subject to this kind of mobilizable behavior. 
But in Taiwan , it has become risen to the highest standred due to the general domestic chaos which is taking place against uncertainty Left-wing's history and culture in the security environment.
In recent years, the skin-deep declarations by Taiwanese former president Chen Shui-Bian , that Taiwan has no Left-wing and Right-wing that put the Taiwanese military in a predicament.
Is the Taiwanese military not supposed to prepare for warfare ?
If so , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism will bring into question their very reason for being. 
In turn , we do not ask for warfare , and do not fear for warfare.
Taiwanese top political and military leaders could not make options from Left-wing's history and culture , and thereby destroy our comprehensive defense capabilities. 
The bureaucrats of Left-wing's history and culture have never been unwilling to take risks.
So making difficult decisions and options which means that must be imposed by a determined Taiwanese top political and military leaders establishment.
It follows from the new military strategic doctrine that Left-wing's militia is complex.
As we want to being prepared for wars of the future.
Taiwanese military forces must be prepared to fight alongside partners or to fight alone. 
As primitive as Left-wing's militia , history and culture guerrillas , attack us sophisticatedly to do the same , so if being ready to fight effectively counterattack ; if our Reserve Mobilization Force can be as powerful.
It follows that Taiwanese Reserve Mobilization Force must be ready to counterattack any Left-wing's militia invasion of  Taiwanese homeland and capable of mounting military interventions beyond when needed.
【3】【Current absurities in Taiwanese Left-wing's militia】
Despite Left-wing's militia no longer constitute a threat to Taiwan , but our military requirements shuld own contingency deployed for a significant war.
I may only assume that Taiwanese political and military leaders should regard Left-wing's militia in much the same model.
However , Taiwanese partners must miss Left-wing's militia threat , suah as miss the Red China threat.
Since they own big subversive capabilities , so it is only prudent to hedge against the worst situation scenario. 
Even they are not an enemy today but it is easy to become enemu in the future,
For Taiwan , this worst situation scenario is seen as Left-wing's militia supported with the added forces of Taiwan.
National Defense Force was that military capabilities are to be taken into account , rather than intentions of history and culture.
Because military capabilities take many years to success , yet intentions of history and culture can change overnight.
I am confident that Taiwanese people agree this strategic concept with Reserve Mobilization Mechanism , while they are less outspoken about it.
Yet , for Taiwan's political change that have taken place over the past 20 years , but very little has changed in the fundamental model.
In other words , seriously affect Taiwanese people conditions are Left-wing's economy situation.
Indeed , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism has been a long in the Taiwan.
In turn , Left-wing's history and culture are afficting Taiwan's defensive posture. 
Due to the current and foreseeable balance of forces , Taiwan would not hope to mount a serious challenge to Sino military force.
Chillingly , in the action of revived Left-wing's history and culture , only Left-wing's militia can be relied on to negate Taiwan's terrorized imbalance.
Left-wing's militia force cannot come close to minimally sufficient defense capabilities.
On the other hand , Taiwan is no conceivable military force that could justify sustaining current deployment for conventional force.
Indeed , Sino may develops as a threat , and so much depends on Taiwan's military reform.
It also depends on Taiwan's future with Taiwanese partnership.
Finally , over the next eight years , the current Taiwan , driven as it is by Left-wing's history and culture bureaucratic inertia and the lack of End of history.
Taiwanese Reserve Mobilization Force remains quite large , but as Left-wing's history and culture continue to worsen qualitatively , am]nd also facing collapse.
Fortunately , Taiwan is no Sino's threat , and coming from the looms of Left-wing's history and culture.
Therefore , there is , the possibility that by the time Left-wing's militia threat manifests itself , Taiwan will have to face that threat with coming from Left-wing's history and culture force , such as China's domestic Left-wing's militia.
Under Left-wing's history and culture , Taiwanese military force looked like the People's Liberation Army of 1980'.
Left-wing's militia would be lacking in training , and mobility
Left-wing's militia would be lacking in science and technology , that  worsen the powerful Taiwan's National defense industries.
Left-wing's militia will not be capable of defending the Taiwan from threats.
In fact , they will become a significant challenge and threat to Taiwan's own National security and Homeland security.
And that will be a very fear possibility.
【4】【Taiwan's Homeland Security Environment】
Taiwan's Homeland Security Environment
In longer term , Taiwan would be lacking of security policy , and overlooking reality of secure framework.
Indeed , at least through the next 20 years , Taiwan's domestic security concerns will be determined by the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism huge reforms in the inter.
Left-wing's history and culture must be collapsed.
Or Sino has already lost its partnership , including its 14 hundred millions of Chinese.
Even the Sino's domestic has also started to separate as evidenced in the domestic Left-wing's militia.
Left-wing's history and culture , for longer time , only purely symbolic. 
But Taiwanese security concepts , ideology , and Homeland values have been different with the Sino , sometimes , even diametrically opposed with each other.
Left-wing's history and culture political and military juxtaposition was dangerous - they were not quite clear , stable , and unpredictable.
As Taiwan should reduce Left-wing's history and culture , but the country finds itself in an entirely new environment. 
Now , Taiwan is a high degree political , social , and economic instability - many Taiwanese people remain to Left-wing's history and culture , such as stupid Left-wing's militia.
In turn , when faces the domestic tension that will be likely to fire off the armed conflict.
Taiwanese is passing through Left-wing's history and culture social and economic crisis , the end of which is unpredictable.
A financial crisis , industries superiority on the downside, and the heavy loss of Taiwanese talents have made Taiwan depend on the Sino.
But Taiwan remains a big power - its Taiwanese partners resources , solid industrial base , and the historical legacy of homeland status that all assure Taiwan's status at a much higher level than its current Left-wing's history and culture status would warrant.
Taiwan remains one of the regional military superiority - Taiwan remains the powerful military force in its conventional Army , Navy , Airforce.
It goes without saying that the military balance in the Taiwan has already changed during the last few years ; overlooked the character of the changes in Left-wing's history and culture.
Taiwan most probably is being taken over by the Sino but by Left-wing's history and culture multipolarity. 
In other words , Left-wing's history and culture country should have been ended.
Taiwan , if it will be able to end Left-wing's history and culture and and correctly defines Reserve Mobilization Mechanism in the new National Defense Relation , will remain to own National military force.
It is at least conceivable that in 20 years new Reserve Mobilization Mechanism could lead to a new military force.
Left-wing's militia does not seem very likely to become the Homeland security of defensive force.
A truly Taiwanese flocks will remain for a long time. 
To sum up , Taiwan will be facing and owning a number of partnerships with considerable National military forces.
Left-wing's militia may provoke a security problem for Taiwan individually or in some combination. 
Most probably this threat would be direct , apparent itself through their support of Left-wing's history and culture , policies m or movement which are directed against Taiwan , especially , the Sino.
Another possibility is that Left-wing's militia will support history and culture activities against the government of the Sino , as was the case in 愛國同心會 and 統一促進黨.
As Taiwan should maintain a clear-cut conventional military and reserve mobilization mechanism superiority.
If this conventional military and reserve mobilization mechanism superiority will not be effective in achieving Taiwanese National objectives , that would signify wrong strategic deployments or misapplication of military power. 
On the other hand , Left-wing's militia is supported by government of the Sino , then the conflict might upgrade to challenge Anerica's military power on a global region.
In the East Asin , Sino could present a threat to the United States , including Taiwan.
So Left-wing's militia is a example , in particular , supported by government of the Sino.
As Taiwan should be maintaining the status quo of its tactical and strategic superiority , therefore , Taiwanese Tsai's administration , has effective tactical deployments of at least owning , and constraining , the emergence of Left-wing's militia hypothetical threat.

【Conclusions】

Taiwan's furure defense objectives
Left-wing's militia without going into much detail.
Obviously , given the large-scale redeployments , or restructuring are needed in situation of the current and the future to face the National security and Homeland security environments , especially ,  the Nation's economic challenges.
Taiwan , needs a pushing new model of National Military Strategy , if it wants to own new security commitmen.
Left-wing's militia goes against the available traditional strategic priorities , and also not fits within the options of the new political and stategic realities.
Traditionally , the ROC , where the largest concentrations of forces have been deployed , and has to become Taiwan's primary resource for the Reserve Mobilization.
In fact , this is it , up to Taiwan's political leaders to explicitly order the military would not turn to Left-side , since any 
Taiwan would not have abilities to conventional war with the Taiwan.
The only exception should be to commit enough of counterattacked capability , to provide for deterrence. 
Taiwan neither faces an external threat from Sino , and they should not create the threat to Taiwanese partners.
In turn , Taiwan needs to maintain the status quo of powerful forces.
The best hope for future stability and security in Taiwan is for the maintaining the status quo of developing nonoffensive military capabilities , to seek that we are not turning , and to be keeping to good partnership with the Sino.
In addition , it would be in every Taiwanese people best interest if Taiwan would refrain from Left-wing's history and culture , economy.
The primary stationing areas for the ROC's armed forces are the Taiwan , Kinmen , Matsu Islands , Dongsha Islands , and Itu Aba Island.
The defense of Taiwanese homeland , neither massive nor deployments of military forces foreign or in the Taiwan. 
The standing army and the Reserve Mobilization Force are to accommodate rapidly deployed counterattacking units would be enough.
Due to the long lines of Left-wing's history and culture , economy , and their "Big Words" , and vulnerability - a somewhat the Reserve Mobilization Force will need to be permanently deployed in the Taiwan area.
These will not number nearly as many as the 600 thousand troops deployed Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In turn , some 2 of the Reserve Mobilization Forced units would be enough.
In terms of numbers , Taiwanese standing army maintains approximately about 30 ten thousand soliders - a force of 30 ten thousand soliders would seem to be a realistic and reliable deployment.
By this date , Taiwan should have owned a professional troops.
Indeed , Taiwan will be able to keep a professional 30 ten thousand soliders , with the Reserve Mobilization Force.
The main difficulty is how to get from our military position is to where we should own its position , and given current political , economic , and social challenges.
The goal is to speed up our kicking out of Left-wing's history and culture , lies of economy to acquire a much smaller but the best Taiwanese flock force over the next 20 years.
Taiwan must also maintain the status quo of the core of the current National science and technology so that the Taiwan will be able to be assured of the capability for facing unpredictable and unforeseen challenges.
Especially , ROC would not be served better by armed forces top heavy in senior officers but lacking in Taiwanese people junior officers , sergeants , and soliders.
As we need a new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism to re-train officers for new era.
Absolutely , of course , This approach would run counter to Left-wing's history and culture , but fit in with Taaditional and Destined Taiwanese.
Only a determined and powerful standing army and Reserve Mobilization Force will be able to face the challenges.
The standing army is only maintaing the status quo of rapid deployment.
In other words , three of heavy and three light division equivalents would be enough.
In case of the emergence of a Left-wing's militia threat , reserves of the polices and the military police from other units , are manned mostly by sergeants.
The Navy's mission should be fundamentally defensive , in particular , have the the fleet submarine protection mission of homeland maritime , especially , sea lines of communications.
To sum up , Taiwanese standing army must have the capability to retarget quickly so that they can be viable defense Left-wing's history and culture violence terrorism and extremism.
Taiwanese partners are dead memorial tablet in that our new strategy and doctrine should focus on the warfare of Taiwanese standing army and Reserve Mobilization Force.
The new Reserve Mobilization Force will be so much a come to war as we are pals of deployment.
This should suffice for Left-wing's history and culture violence terrorism and extremism.
In turn , Taiwanese standing army needs to be exceptional and innovative End of history.
It will be uniquely Taiwanese National Defense Force , a force capable of defending the country - Taiwan , against potential threats while fitting into Taiwan's independent and democratic political system , with free economy.