POSTED BY 台灣窮小子
MR.PRESIDENT OF TAIWAN 蔡英文之首席真命天子
THIRD , FEBRUARY , 2018
31 , JANUARY , 2018
【NEW MODEL OF THE NATIONAL RESERVE MOBILIZATION MECHANISM】
POSTED BY 台灣窮小子
MR.PRESIDENT OF TAIWAN 蔡英文之首席真命天子
THIRD , FEBRUARY , 2018
31 , JANUARY , 2018
This views of expressed in this report - the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism are the author of Mr.President of Taiwan , Tsai Ing-wen's son of the destiny ; the National Reserve Force is for public , and Left-wing's militia is stupid.
Today's the topic of which is Taiwan's secure force as the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism.
The current Taiwanese Leftists discussed various aspects of the many crises besetting Taiwan ,such as Left-wing's militia , and there were not views on whether Taiwan would be able to get over those crises and establish a politically stable freedom and independence.
In my remarks , I stated that political and economic reform of Left-wing's history and culture has fundamentally failed , so that I might reasonably fear further collapse in the Taiwanese military force , and the next , political and economic frameworks.
The very fact that Taiwan's KMT and DPP parties were overlooking the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism , in longer term , and that indicate the Taiwan has already lost military superiority in the past of two decades.
I outline a vision for the future of the Taiwanese military force that my idea is set within a well-reasoned strategic context and takes into consideration of the new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism in Taiwan's domestic political and economic environment , independence and freedom and the further development of end of history and culture.
We should be working to build new model of partnership in the Reserve Force.
The security dimensions of that relationship remains integral to ultimate National Military Force shape.
For that reason , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism has most significant implications for Taiwanese military force.
The very title of Left-wing's militia is quite ambiguous.
Put simply , Left-wing's militia would not be able to rapidly respond any serious change in superior organization like the National military force.
On the other hand , Left-wing's history and culture would not continued , and without Reserve Force is impossible to predict the evolution of military force , at least , revolutionary shifts in the technologies and economics contexts , and the relative military balance.
Therefore , in taliking the prospects for Taiwanese military forces , it approximates realistic to the future 20 years - re-integrates the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism.
It thinks consideration of the possible realignment of principal Taiwanese partners , and it provides time to operate weapons deployments.
Accordingly , with a timeframe of 20 years , future trends of Reserve Forces are remaining sufficiently added in reality of deployments , without entering the world of Left-wing's history and culture.
This is an appropriate sitiation for the fulfillment of economic and military development in Taiwan.
So the current strategic options will obviously affect developments in 20 years of the future.
In particular , what happens in that process will define how the Taiwanese military force.
Within this temporal framework , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism are one of elements of the comprehensive notion of military reform , and bigger than the narrow notion of Left-wing's militia.
【2】【Current absurities in Taiwanese Left-wing's militia】
Current absurities in Taiwanese Left-wing's militia.
The current chaotic - bureaucracies situation of the administrative structures in the Taiwan's DPP government have brought about the enormous negative effect on the National Defense Deployments.
This is a particularly dangerous development when taken against the background of socialismn, or communism , from Left-wing's history and culture give up the free economy and from independent political mechanism.
Left-wing's history and culture have left the National military forces virtually on their own , or leading forced change within the National military forces in their Nation of ideological , political , strategic , economic , and demographic contexts.
The fundamental deficiency in the current military strategy and Left-wing's history adn culture are a great relaxation in Taiwan's DPP government.
In addition , this lack of Left-wing's history and culture control have mismanagement and enormous chaos , and has disarranged much needed military reform.
It has created enormous disasters for the Taiwanese military by preventing redeployment of forces , reducing defense conversion , worsening the military personnel system , and hastily affecting Taiwan for most of its officers.
Left-wing's militia lacks of the National security concept , only the model of the National Reserve Mobilization condition has been adapted by traditional military trainings and concepts.
In other words , The military forces and the departments of the Taiwanese General Staff should intensify the National stratgies and doctrines , the models of deployment , personnel missions , rather than Left-wing's militia has come at the expense of readiness and training , in turn , their ability to execute missions warranted by the National security is scant.
Institutionally , Taiwanese military are different than other countries , only keep history and culture , overlook as Taiwanese people of our traditional strategic roles , while not allow to the realities of the operational missions amd the war environment.
Hense , the self-preservation of Left-wing's history and culture determine for Left-wing's militia framework and deployment , with the primary condition being taken over power.
So National military strategy pushes the threat assessment.
Through with threat assessments establishing the National Reserve Mobilization , deployment , and mechanism.
To some extent , whatever military as well as civilian , must be subject to this kind of mobilizable behavior.
But in Taiwan , it has become risen to the highest standred due to the general domestic chaos which is taking place against uncertainty Left-wing's history and culture in the security environment.
In recent years, the skin-deep declarations by Taiwanese former president Chen Shui-Bian , that Taiwan has no Left-wing and Right-wing that put the Taiwanese military in a predicament.
Is the Taiwanese military not supposed to prepare for warfare ?
If so , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism will bring into question their very reason for being.
In turn , we do not ask for warfare , and do not fear for warfare.
Taiwanese top political and military leaders could not make options from Left-wing's history and culture , and thereby destroy our comprehensive defense capabilities.
The bureaucrats of Left-wing's history and culture have never been unwilling to take risks.
So making difficult decisions and options which means that must be imposed by a determined Taiwanese top political and military leaders establishment.
It follows from the new military strategic doctrine that Left-wing's militia is complex.
As we want to being prepared for wars of the future.
Taiwanese military forces must be prepared to fight alongside partners or to fight alone.
As primitive as Left-wing's militia , history and culture guerrillas , attack us sophisticatedly to do the same , so if being ready to fight effectively counterattack ; if our Reserve Mobilization Force can be as powerful.
It follows that Taiwanese Reserve Mobilization Force must be ready to counterattack any Left-wing's militia invasion of Taiwanese homeland and capable of mounting military interventions beyond when needed.
【3】【Current absurities in Taiwanese Left-wing's militia】
Despite Left-wing's militia no longer constitute a threat to Taiwan , but our military requirements shuld own contingency deployed for a significant war.
I may only assume that Taiwanese political and military leaders should regard Left-wing's militia in much the same model.
However , Taiwanese partners must miss Left-wing's militia threat , suah as miss the Red China threat.
Since they own big subversive capabilities , so it is only prudent to hedge against the worst situation scenario.
Even they are not an enemy today but it is easy to become enemu in the future,
For Taiwan , this worst situation scenario is seen as Left-wing's militia supported with the added forces of Taiwan.
National Defense Force was that military capabilities are to be taken into account , rather than intentions of history and culture.
Because military capabilities take many years to success , yet intentions of history and culture can change overnight.
I am confident that Taiwanese people agree this strategic concept with Reserve Mobilization Mechanism , while they are less outspoken about it.
Yet , for Taiwan's political change that have taken place over the past 20 years , but very little has changed in the fundamental model.
In other words , seriously affect Taiwanese people conditions are Left-wing's economy situation.
Indeed , the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism has been a long in the Taiwan.
In turn , Left-wing's history and culture are afficting Taiwan's defensive posture.
Due to the current and foreseeable balance of forces , Taiwan would not hope to mount a serious challenge to Sino military force.
Chillingly , in the action of revived Left-wing's history and culture , only Left-wing's militia can be relied on to negate Taiwan's terrorized imbalance.
Left-wing's militia force cannot come close to minimally sufficient defense capabilities.
On the other hand , Taiwan is no conceivable military force that could justify sustaining current deployment for conventional force.
Indeed , Sino may develops as a threat , and so much depends on Taiwan's military reform.
It also depends on Taiwan's future with Taiwanese partnership.
Finally , over the next eight years , the current Taiwan , driven as it is by Left-wing's history and culture bureaucratic inertia and the lack of End of history.
Taiwanese Reserve Mobilization Force remains quite large , but as Left-wing's history and culture continue to worsen qualitatively , am]nd also facing collapse.
Fortunately , Taiwan is no Sino's threat , and coming from the looms of Left-wing's history and culture.
Therefore , there is , the possibility that by the time Left-wing's militia threat manifests itself , Taiwan will have to face that threat with coming from Left-wing's history and culture force , such as China's domestic Left-wing's militia.
Under Left-wing's history and culture , Taiwanese military force looked like the People's Liberation Army of 1980'.
Left-wing's militia would be lacking in training , and mobility
Left-wing's militia would be lacking in science and technology , that worsen the powerful Taiwan's National defense industries.
Left-wing's militia will not be capable of defending the Taiwan from threats.
In fact , they will become a significant challenge and threat to Taiwan's own National security and Homeland security.
And that will be a very fear possibility.
【4】【Taiwan's Homeland Security Environment】
Taiwan's Homeland Security Environment
In longer term , Taiwan would be lacking of security policy , and overlooking reality of secure framework.
Indeed , at least through the next 20 years , Taiwan's domestic security concerns will be determined by the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism huge reforms in the inter.
Left-wing's history and culture must be collapsed.
Or Sino has already lost its partnership , including its 14 hundred millions of Chinese.
Even the Sino's domestic has also started to separate as evidenced in the domestic Left-wing's militia.
Left-wing's history and culture , for longer time , only purely symbolic.
But Taiwanese security concepts , ideology , and Homeland values have been different with the Sino , sometimes , even diametrically opposed with each other.
Left-wing's history and culture political and military juxtaposition was dangerous - they were not quite clear , stable , and unpredictable.
As Taiwan should reduce Left-wing's history and culture , but the country finds itself in an entirely new environment.
Now , Taiwan is a high degree political , social , and economic instability - many Taiwanese people remain to Left-wing's history and culture , such as stupid Left-wing's militia.
In turn , when faces the domestic tension that will be likely to fire off the armed conflict.
Taiwanese is passing through Left-wing's history and culture social and economic crisis , the end of which is unpredictable.
A financial crisis , industries superiority on the downside, and the heavy loss of Taiwanese talents have made Taiwan depend on the Sino.
But Taiwan remains a big power - its Taiwanese partners resources , solid industrial base , and the historical legacy of homeland status that all assure Taiwan's status at a much higher level than its current Left-wing's history and culture status would warrant.
Taiwan remains one of the regional military superiority - Taiwan remains the powerful military force in its conventional Army , Navy , Airforce.
It goes without saying that the military balance in the Taiwan has already changed during the last few years ; overlooked the character of the changes in Left-wing's history and culture.
Taiwan most probably is being taken over by the Sino but by Left-wing's history and culture multipolarity.
In other words , Left-wing's history and culture country should have been ended.
Taiwan , if it will be able to end Left-wing's history and culture and and correctly defines Reserve Mobilization Mechanism in the new National Defense Relation , will remain to own National military force.
It is at least conceivable that in 20 years new Reserve Mobilization Mechanism could lead to a new military force.
Left-wing's militia does not seem very likely to become the Homeland security of defensive force.
A truly Taiwanese flocks will remain for a long time.
To sum up , Taiwan will be facing and owning a number of partnerships with considerable National military forces.
Left-wing's militia may provoke a security problem for Taiwan individually or in some combination.
Most probably this threat would be direct , apparent itself through their support of Left-wing's history and culture , policies m or movement which are directed against Taiwan , especially , the Sino.
Another possibility is that Left-wing's militia will support history and culture activities against the government of the Sino , as was the case in 愛國同心會 and 統一促進黨.
As Taiwan should maintain a clear-cut conventional military and reserve mobilization mechanism superiority.
If this conventional military and reserve mobilization mechanism superiority will not be effective in achieving Taiwanese National objectives , that would signify wrong strategic deployments or misapplication of military power.
On the other hand , Left-wing's militia is supported by government of the Sino , then the conflict might upgrade to challenge Anerica's military power on a global region.
In the East Asin , Sino could present a threat to the United States , including Taiwan.
So Left-wing's militia is a example , in particular , supported by government of the Sino.
As Taiwan should be maintaining the status quo of its tactical and strategic superiority , therefore , Taiwanese Tsai's administration , has effective tactical deployments of at least owning , and constraining , the emergence of Left-wing's militia hypothetical threat.
Taiwan's furure defense objectives
Left-wing's militia without going into much detail.
Obviously , given the large-scale redeployments , or restructuring are needed in situation of the current and the future to face the National security and Homeland security environments , especially , the Nation's economic challenges.
Taiwan , needs a pushing new model of National Military Strategy , if it wants to own new security commitmen.
Left-wing's militia goes against the available traditional strategic priorities , and also not fits within the options of the new political and stategic realities.
Traditionally , the ROC , where the largest concentrations of forces have been deployed , and has to become Taiwan's primary resource for the Reserve Mobilization.
In fact , this is it , up to Taiwan's political leaders to explicitly order the military would not turn to Left-side , since any
Taiwan would not have abilities to conventional war with the Taiwan.
The only exception should be to commit enough of counterattacked capability , to provide for deterrence.
Taiwan neither faces an external threat from Sino , and they should not create the threat to Taiwanese partners.
In turn , Taiwan needs to maintain the status quo of powerful forces.
The best hope for future stability and security in Taiwan is for the maintaining the status quo of developing nonoffensive military capabilities , to seek that we are not turning , and to be keeping to good partnership with the Sino.
In addition , it would be in every Taiwanese people best interest if Taiwan would refrain from Left-wing's history and culture , economy.
The primary stationing areas for the ROC's armed forces are the Taiwan , Kinmen , Matsu Islands , Dongsha Islands , and Itu Aba Island.
The defense of Taiwanese homeland , neither massive nor deployments of military forces foreign or in the Taiwan.
The standing army and the Reserve Mobilization Force are to accommodate rapidly deployed counterattacking units would be enough.
Due to the long lines of Left-wing's history and culture , economy , and their "Big Words" , and vulnerability - a somewhat the Reserve Mobilization Force will need to be permanently deployed in the Taiwan area.
These will not number nearly as many as the 600 thousand troops deployed Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s.
In turn , some 2 of the Reserve Mobilization Forced units would be enough.
In terms of numbers , Taiwanese standing army maintains approximately about 30 ten thousand soliders - a force of 30 ten thousand soliders would seem to be a realistic and reliable deployment.
By this date , Taiwan should have owned a professional troops.
Indeed , Taiwan will be able to keep a professional 30 ten thousand soliders , with the Reserve Mobilization Force.
The main difficulty is how to get from our military position is to where we should own its position , and given current political , economic , and social challenges.
The goal is to speed up our kicking out of Left-wing's history and culture , lies of economy to acquire a much smaller but the best Taiwanese flock force over the next 20 years.
Taiwan must also maintain the status quo of the core of the current National science and technology so that the Taiwan will be able to be assured of the capability for facing unpredictable and unforeseen challenges.
Especially , ROC would not be served better by armed forces top heavy in senior officers but lacking in Taiwanese people junior officers , sergeants , and soliders.
As we need a new model of the National Reserve Mobilization Mechanism to re-train officers for new era.
Absolutely , of course , This approach would run counter to Left-wing's history and culture , but fit in with Taaditional and Destined Taiwanese.
Only a determined and powerful standing army and Reserve Mobilization Force will be able to face the challenges.
The standing army is only maintaing the status quo of rapid deployment.
In other words , three of heavy and three light division equivalents would be enough.
In case of the emergence of a Left-wing's militia threat , reserves of the polices and the military police from other units , are manned mostly by sergeants.
The Navy's mission should be fundamentally defensive , in particular , have the the fleet submarine protection mission of homeland maritime , especially , sea lines of communications.
To sum up , Taiwanese standing army must have the capability to retarget quickly so that they can be viable defense Left-wing's history and culture violence terrorism and extremism.
Taiwanese partners are dead memorial tablet in that our new strategy and doctrine should focus on the warfare of Taiwanese standing army and Reserve Mobilization Force.
The new Reserve Mobilization Force will be so much a come to war as we are pals of deployment.
This should suffice for Left-wing's history and culture violence terrorism and extremism.
In turn , Taiwanese standing army needs to be exceptional and innovative End of history.
It will be uniquely Taiwanese National Defense Force , a force capable of defending the country - Taiwan , against potential threats while fitting into Taiwan's independent and democratic political system , with free economy.