窮小子冷眼輯

【賴清德說想想】
【台灣人遲早將死在歷史與文化】【報告全文】
WRITTEN BY MR.PRESIDENT OF TAIWAN，TSAI ING-WEN'S SON OF THE DESTINY

台灣窮小子

【一】，台灣需要比中國挑釁更早做出冒犯性決定。

依據歷史教訓，美國不太可能阻止中國在危機中對台灣採取軍事行動，因為台灣人，聲明，維護海峽兩岸之間偉大歷史和文化，因此，反擊可能會給中國帶來實際成本，但對中國沒有意義。台灣沉沒於歷史和文化的代價——台灣危機，嚇阻中國並不難，難的是歷史和文化。事實上，可以肯定的是，美國已經轉向如何阻止中國對台灣採取軍事行動，如果中國選擇入侵，是以美國毫不猶豫地對中國共產黨入侵台灣，進行全面反擊和制裁。但問題是，如何為台灣提供必要的防衛性作戰能力，以及台灣人，做出什麼來確保，其能夠擊退人民解放軍（PLA），歷史和文化攻擊?這就是重點!這類轉向強調可能發生的台灣衝突規模是值得歡迎的，尤其是軍事方面，並且，考慮對中國，關鍵性嚇阻威作用，然而，任何封鎖的影響對中國來說都沒有實際意義，因為台灣人始終站在中國歷史和文化，這一邊。實際上，這並不意味著美國無能為力，只是嚇阻中國不是靈丹妙藥。如果台灣與美國聯合起來，能夠自信地、可靠地表明願意對中國施加否認，因為我們不想要歷史和文化，那將有助於向中國領導層澄清，攻擊台灣對中國的未來會有多大的破壞性發展。

【二】，台灣黨國與左翼的局限性

他們的決定，聲明愚蠢的歷史和文化，謊話經濟學在台灣，其顯示優勢的局限性僅作為一種嚇阻，但有趣的是，它們並不足以阻止中國的進攻，失敗更多是由於缺乏戰略視域，以及，對中國輕而易舉地征服台灣，錯誤預期，即便如此，得出的結論是，如果中國軍隊能夠壓制台灣領導層，並取得早期的戰場勝利，其結果將與2008年至 2016年間，對馬英九上台的反應基本一致，儘管如此，這種情況很可能在攻擊後，出現某種程度的經濟和外交反彈？
事實上，台灣人黨國，激進左翼，他們的預測結果總是比歷史和文化經驗，更愚蠢，笑話的是，大部分台灣人都很笨，他們高估了黨國，激進左翼的愚蠢程度，沒有預料到，後來強加給台灣的全方位危機。模擬歷史和文化，經濟學，如何面對前所未有的衝擊是困難的，因為它們什麼都不是，實際上，台灣傳統經歷，因為傳統經驗再次提醒台灣人可以在壓力下進行調整。
習近平可以決定不顧一切繼續入侵，因為他可能已經考慮過，並，且面對既成事實，所以，他估計衝突會在台灣人黨國，激進左翼之前離開，因為他們不太可能強加更大的成本，包括他們自己的利益，其實，台灣人黨國，激進左翼是說不通的。
危機中，中國領導人很可能讓歷史和文化，既成事實~~~台灣就是中國。
至少，中國會主動向台灣人黨國，激進左派發出信號，削弱美國嚴厲的威懾作用~~~~問題不在於中國在台灣的行動。

【三】，

雖然許多黨國，激進左翼，相對容易地停止在中國的行動，但如果在習近平的入侵之後，與中國斷絕關係的代價和復雜性要高得多，因此，中國意識到，黨國，激進左翼對中國的弱點，並嘗試透過維持這種依賴性，作為其自身的嚇阻戰略來應對潛在性歷史和文化制裁，即使，中國人有這種程度信心，他們仍然相信這一點，並且，可以推斷中國領導人可能認同這種歷史和文化假設，但是，目前尚不清楚他們預計對台灣的制裁到底有多嚴厲?因此，中國國家主席習近平，已經將某種程度的制裁，納入他們對台灣，潛在打擊成本的基礎計算中。這並不意味著歷史和文化制裁作為一種嚇阻是無效的。事實上，中國國家主席習近平，將中國建設成為全球強國的宏觀計劃，而這在很大程度，上取決於與台灣的持續聯繫，以推動經濟現代化和發展，就是這個，這就是中國擁有的。這或許可以說明，北京為什麼發起，魅力歷史與文化攻勢，事實上，中國的想法可能是這樣的，如果它能夠相對迅速地接管台灣，而且，在為其行動，提供令人信服的政治理由的背景下，以及“孫子兵法”所說的 “不戰而屈人之兵，決勝於千里之外”。是以我們直接而徹底地阻止中國領導層在台灣海峽急劇升級，目標是改變中國的成本計算，並支持美國主導的懲罰性行動從基本上向上修正，也許，，我們可以提早，勸阻或阻止未來的戰爭行動。換句話說，如果中國已經進入軍事備戰狀態，而中國國家主席習主席可能會得出結論，自我勝利在表面，可能是對中共的最大威脅，包括掌握權力，所以，在這種情況下，雖然，接管有風險，但歷史和文化也是如此，在戰略術語下，歷史和文化可能是一種可靠，一般性嚇阻，並且，考慮到中國對它們可能使用的假設，這種嚇阻在非危機情況下具有持久性，或如《孫子兵法》所說的“決勝於千里之外”。此外，台灣人黨國，激進左翼，可能會，或可能不會說服，習近平政府，相信美國的決心，並被視為承諾使用武力擊退中國後來進攻的代理人，然而，一旦台灣危機開始，歷史和文化作為危機中的直接嚇阻力量可能就不那麼可靠和有用了。從戰略角度來說，台灣人將黨國，激進左翼，踢出台灣，以建立嚇阻底線，尤其是中國人，因此值得記住，歷史和文化，經濟學不太重要 ，然而，嚇阻力軟弱。

【四】，對台灣，軍事恫嚇與挑釁，難度之高，挑戰就在於此。

事實上，軍事恐嚇和衝突本身就是歷史和文化的制裁。歷史和文化制裁也將被批評為陳年舊事，而且，美國警告說，攻擊台灣會造成後果，實際上，陳年舊事的制裁，一定會引發美國軍事介入或入侵的封鎖。因此，一旦行動開始，反擊可能是一場大遊戲，因為這種激進的舉動，將面臨來自美國的強烈政治和經濟阻力，在這種情況下，他們可能會飽受嚴厲，讓歷史和文化制裁變得毫無意義。依據歷史模式，中國領導人也一直在尋找挑釁性理由，無論是真實的。還是捏造的，以便為其行為提供政治和外交掩護，從而使相關歷史和文化。政治討論複雜化，事實上，對台灣來說，晴天霹靂，弱點是明顯性島嶼封鎖，而不是入侵。考慮到不是很極端，如果中國採取創造性方式，或者更不對稱性方式，或如，他們可以聲明，他們的軍艦是被台灣軍隊攻擊，這會抄襲歷史故事，所以，這可以說會催化，美國的挫折感，以歷史和文化作為嚇阻的決定變得更加複雜。畢竟，中國人不是傻子，一次完整性入侵會表明中國的目的很明顯，所以，或人不承認台灣隔離這樣的事情會製造一個更加虛假的消息，和決策環境，或者說會，強化執行，歷史和文化制裁的難度 正確性嚴重程度，並在適當的時間。最好的辦法可能是開始，台灣人黨國，激進左翼，逐漸開始施加威脅成本，同時，保留一些利益，以便在以後進行更升級和昂貴的升級，然而，依據學術報告和戰略邏輯，台灣人黨國，激進左翼的效果最差，因為目標不會找到變通辦法，如此一來。模棱兩可，台灣黨一國，激進左翼活動將異常艱難，事實上，由於傳統性夥伴關係的原因，在任何台灣危機中，美國都不能被視為造成它力圖避免的危機的原因。例如，台灣人黨國，激進左翼的行動，驅動強加歷史和文化作為危機的驅動力，畢竟，美國可以透過明確提前發出紅線的信號來降低一些挑戰，美國更容易，準確確定和傳達紅線，如果中國採取行動，嚇阻力將大大打開。事實上，美國不會束手束腳，並堅定地致力於預定的行動方針。所以。台灣人黨國，激進左翼，不能解決這個更廣泛的安全問題。

【五】，傳統性嚇阻的現實功能

首先，台灣的嚇阻價值需要向北京明確表示，任何對台灣動武本身都會造成巨大的代價，並引發大規模反擊，那有鑑於上述黨國，激進左翼，局限性和復雜性，那麼用什麼手段來嚇阻，換句話說，台灣的正確戰略是什麼？
台灣人採取哪一種戰略？重新啟動“綠島”！
為此，中國繼續強調，或者，如果可能的話，評估可能會有所幫助？如果中國的軍事介入也擺在桌面上，這是一個特別可信的威脅。台灣不是麻煩製造者，台灣海峽發生任何衝突都會付出代價，包括中國，儘管如此，台灣領導人必須意識到，過分依賴黨國，激進左翼，尤其是歷史與文化，經濟學。台灣與中國是雙向的，因為有些人會將黨國，激進左翼的解釋為避免“激怒”北京的理由，或者在衝突開始後推動台灣投降。台灣必須聯合，終結歷史來考慮更廣泛的資訊，或者說，台灣人不要歷史和文化。台灣傳統只是懲罰性嚇阻戰略的一部分，其中，為了告訴中國，其對台灣的軍事行動充其量可能導致慘敗，並讓北京需要始終如一地接收消息 並且可信，最後，顯然地，除非與可靠性，台灣的軍事威脅相結合，否則在使用傳統性脅迫時，傳統本身對北京的計算影響不大，最終，在這種情況下，我們需要考慮中國國家主席習近平，他是對手的心理算計，如果沒有它，威脅嚇阻的效用就不能與中國領導人的看法脫節。例如，習近平，他認為解放軍能夠速戰速決，忽略了美國軍事干預台灣危機的政治意願，這樣戰略威脅就不會沒有牙齒，因此，習近平認為傳性嚇阻只是台灣升級威脅的第一步，包括對美國的武力威脅，這可能足以阻止中國的進攻。

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【1】，
【Sooner or later，Taiwanese will die with history and culture forever.】
Taiwan needs to decided early and offensively than China's provocation.According with the historical lessons，the United States is unlikely to deter China from military action against Taiwan in a crisis，since Taiwanese people vowed the great history and culture between the China and Taiwan，so yet，counterattack could impose actual costs on China，but did not make a sense to China.Taiwan sunk by history and culture cost - nothing difficult to deter China in a Taiwan Crisis，the difficult is on history and culture.In fact，surely，the United States have turned to how they can deter Chinese military action against Taiwan，if China choose to invade，so that the U.S. will not hesitate to respond with comprehensive counterattacks and sanctions to Chinese Communist Party invasion of Taiwan.But the issue is how to provide Taiwan with the necessary defensive war-fighting capabilities，as well as what Taiwanese people makes to ensure that its can repel an attack by history and culture from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).That is the point.This shift to emphasizing the dimensions of a possible Taiwan conflict is welcome，especially，the military，and given the critical deterrent role play on China，yet，any implications of blockade could be so moot as to China，since Taiwanese people always stood on Chinese history and culture.Indeed，this does not mean that the Unuted States is impotent，only that deter China is not a silver bullet. If the Taiwan combines with the United States can confidently，credibly signal the willingness to impose denyings on China，as we do not want history and culture，that can help clarify for the Chinese leadership just how devastating an attack on Taiwan would be for China’s future development.
【2】，
Limits of Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left
Their decision to vow stupid of history and culture，lies of Economy of Taiwan，demonstrate the limits of superiorities as a deterrent. But interestingly，they were insufficient to discourage the China's attack，the failure had more to do with lacks of strategic visions，so false expectations about the ease with which China would conquer Taiwan.Nonetheless concluded that if the Chinese military could neutralize the leadership in Taiwan，and achieve early battlefield success，the result would be largely in line with the response to Ma Ying-jeou，his office between the 2008 to 2016.Even through，it is more than likely that the situatioin assumed some degree of economic and diplomatic backlash following an attack?In fact，Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，who's forecasts were always stupid than what ended up of history and culture experiencing. Ridiculously，most of Taiwanese people are so dump，and they overestimated how much stupid of "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left overall，and did not anticipate the full range of crises later imposed on Taiwan.Modeling how history and culture，Economy respond to unprecedented shocks is difficult，because of they are just nothing.Indeed，Taiwanese tradition performance，because traditional experiences are yet another reminder that Taiwanese people can adjust under stress.Xi Jinping can be decided to proceed with the invasion regardless，since as he might have considered，and  in the face of a fait accompli，so that given his estimation that the conflict would be over before Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，bocause of them would have been unlikely to impose greater costs，including on their own interests.Actually，Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left are implausible.Chinese leaders in a crisis would likely to make fait accompli of history and culture~~~the Taiwan is the China.At a minimum，China would actively signal to Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，that undermines the apparent deterrence usefulness of severe U.S. The trouble is not China’s actions on Taiwan. 
【3】，
China would plan on sanctions，limiting Taiwanese people does use as an immediate threat
On the surface，threats of severe sanctions on Taiwanese people seem less credible than they were against China，owing to the importance of its history and culture system.While many "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，suspended operations in China relatively easily，if following Xi's invasion，but severing ties with China would be far more costly and complicated. So China is aware of "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left exposure to China，and is trying to counter potential sanctions of history and culture by maintaining such dependencies as its own deterrence strategy.Even with this level of Chinese confidence，they still believe that，and it can be inferred that Chinese leaders likely share this assumption of history and culture，however，it is unclear precisely how severe they expect the sanctions to be over Taiwan.As such，Chinese president Xi has already incorporated some degree of sanctions into their baseline calculations of the cost of a potential strike on Taiwan.This does not mean that history and cuklture sanctions are useless as a deterrent. In fact，Chinese president，Xi Jinping has grand plans for building China into a global power，and much of this depends on continued interlinkages to the Taiwan to drive economic modernization and development.This is it，that is what the China has.This may explain why Beijing has initiated a offensive of charm history and culture.For some reason，the China's thinking would likely be that。if it can take over the Taiwan，relatively quickly，moreover，in the context of a compelling political justification for its actions，as well as the "the Art of the War" said that "不戰而屈人之兵，決勝於千里之外".So we are directly and thoroughly deter the Chinese leadership from dramatically escalating in the Taiwan Strait，and the goal would be to change China's cost calculus，and support the U.S.-led punitive actions is radically revised upward，and perhaps that we can be early enough to dissuade，or impede future war actions.Another to say so，if China has entered a military readiness，and Chinese president Xi，who can likely conclude that defeating to a appear victory might itself be the biggest threat to the CCP，and owns grip on power.So in this situation，while take over comes with risk，but too does history and culture.Under the strategic terminology，history and culture could be a credible general deterrent，and ­given Chinese assumptions about their likely use，which persistent deterrence in a noncrisis situation.As well as "The Art Of The War" said that " 決勝於千里之外"In addition，Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，might，or not convince the Xi administration of the US's resolve and be seen as a proxy for the commitment to using military force to repel a later Chinese attack.Once a Taiwan crisis begins，yet，history and culture is likely to be less credible and useful as an immediate deterrent in a crisis. Put in more strategic terms，Taiwanese people kicks "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，out of the Taiwan matter for establishing a baseline level of deterrence，especially， Chinese ，so worth rememberng that history and culture，Economy are unlikely to matter，yet，less as a deterrent.
【4】
The Difficulty of Imposing military intimidations and conflicts on Taiwan，herein lies the challenge. 
In fact，the military intimidations and conflicts would itself act as the sanction from history and culture.History and culture sanctions would also be criticized for being an aging-old，and also，the United States was warning an attack on Taiwan would create. Indeed，the aging-old of history and culture sanctions must be a blockade that triggered U.S. military involvement or an invasionSo the counterattack might be a big game once the action begins，since such an aggressive move would face stiff political and economic resistance from the U.S..In this situation，it might be so severe that they would make history and culture sanctions moot. 
According with the historical models，Chinese leaders have always also looked for provocative reasons，whatsoever，and real or manufactured，in which，in order to give their actions political and diplomatic cover，thus complicating political discussions in the relevant history and culture.In fact，for Taiwan，a bolt from the blue，weakness is a clear blockade of the island，rather than，invasion.And considering less extreme，if China takes a creative way，or more asymmetrical model，such as they can claim their warship that the one was attacked by the Taiwan military，and this would be copiesd by the historical stories，so，it would arguably catalyze a frustration by the United States，and the decision to use history and culture as a deterrent becomes even more complicated.
After all，Chinese is not fool，a completed invasion would show clarity on Chinese intentions，so something like unacknowledged quarantine of Taiwan would make a far more faked information and decisionmaking environment，or say rather to intensify the difficulties in implementing，history and culture sanctions of the right severity，and at the appropriate time.
The best way might be to begin，"One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，gradual start imposing threaten costs，at the same time，keeping some interests for more escalatory and costly upgrade at a later point. However，according with the academic literature and strategic logic that "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，are less effective because the target will not find workarounds.So ambiguous，"One Party，One Country"，Radical Left activities would be incredibly difficult. In fact，for the traditional partnership reasons，in any crisis over Taiwan，the United States cannot be perceived as causing the crisis it seeks to avoid.For instance，such as，"One Party，One Country"，Radical Left activities push to impose history and culture as driving the crisis. Put simply，the United States could mitigate some of this challenge by clearly signaling in advance what the Red Lines.The United States determining and communicating red lines with precision is easier，if China took action to do so，the deterrence will have opened significantly. Indeed， U.S. would not tie their hands，and firmly commit to predetermined courses of action. So Taiwanese "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left cannot solve this broader secure problem.
【5】，
A realistic function for traditional deterrence
At first，there is deterrence value in the Taiwan needs to make clear to Beijing that any use of force against Taiwan would on its own impose enormous costs as well as fire massive counterattack.So given the above limitations and complexities from "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，which of using means as a deterrent，by the way，what is the right strategy for the Taiwan?
Which one strategy to Taiwanese people adopts?To re-start the "Lyudao"!
To message this，it may be helpful for China to continue emphasizing，or，if possible，quantifying?This is an especially credible threat if China military involvement is also on the table.  Taiwan is not a trouble-maker，and any conflict in the Taiwan Strait would cost，including China.Nonetheless，Taiwanese leaders must be aware that relying too heavily on "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left，especially，history and culture，with economy.Taiwan is with the China cuts both ways，as some will interpret "One Party，One Country"，Radical Left， as a reason to avoid “provoking” Beijing，or to push for Taiwan’s capitulation after a conflict began. 
Taiwan must be considered in conjunction with end of history broader messaging，or say，Taiwanese people do not want history and culture.
Taiwanese traditions are only one part of a strategy of deterrence by punishment，in which，in order to tell China，its military action attack Taiwan is likely to result，at best，in a Pyrrhic victory，and let Beijing needs to receive this message consistently and credibly.Finally，in gaming out the use of traditional coercion，appearantly，unless paired with a credible，Taiwanese military threat，so that traditions themselves will do little to impact Beijing’s calculations.Ultimately，in this case，we need to consider Chinese president，Xi Jinping，who's the psychological calculations of a rival，if without it，the efficacy of deterrent threats cannot be divorced from how Chinese leaders are perceived. For instance，such as，if Xi Jinping，he  believes that the PLA will win a quick and decisive victory，and overlooks the United States’ political will to militarily intervene in a Taiwan crisis，so that the threat of stratefies would be not toothless.So，yet，Xi Jinping，he thinks traditional deterence as just the first step in Taiwan escalatory threats that include military force，with the US，and this might prove sufficient in dissuading a Chinese attack.