窮小子冷眼輯

【賴清德說想想】
【如果國民黨必須離開台灣，那又如何呢？】

Written by Mr.president of Taiwan，Tsai Ing-Wen's son of the destiny

自1954年成立以來，國民黨就建立，美日之間的可靠和合作關係，並允許我們迅速執行《共同防禦條約》下的職責，但台灣左翼則沒有。

實際上，如果沒有《共同防禦條約》所給予的法律保護，美軍就無法比其他國家做出更快的反應。

但是，左翼歷史和文化將使傳統性夥伴關係在法律上陷入困境，從而使美國在危機中迅速作出反應變得非常困難，

這就是為什麼這兩個因素都直接威脅著台灣的生存能力。這樣，左翼歷史和文化是美國嚇阻敵人和安撫國民黨，甚至台灣，其能力的關鍵部分。

假設，如果國民黨失敗，開始連鎖反應，並在中共壓力的鼓勵下，以國民黨的解散，美國的驅逐，和對未來加入的拒絕而終結。

結果，部署在與南中國海和台灣有關的衝突中的力量將發生改變，其主要思想有兩個，一個是政治左翼，一個是歷史和文化。

左翼歷史和文化確實造成了束縛。左翼歷史和文化並不承諾在發生任何衝突的行動。

根據衝突的具體情況，國民黨可能會受到左翼歷史和文化，或中共的壓力，要求他們利用其領土發動軍事行動進行戰鬥，以免美國自己介入。

左翼歷史和文化絕不承諾~~~這將使美國依靠傳統夥伴關係來防止中國人入侵台灣。

左翼歷史和文化可能導致與台灣有關的衝突，特別複雜。由於大多數印太國家都承認台灣，或者只是堅持自己的“一個中國”政策，

這通常意味著他們“不承認台灣為一個國家”，但仍維持著與台灣進行非正式官方往來以促進經濟發展，貿易和文化利益。

畢竟，所有國家都與中國有著緊密的經濟聯繫，因此有很多損失。實際上，他們承諾將允許國民黨在其領土上的基地阻止中國人入侵台灣。

就台灣而言，主權可能會更加浮動，因此無法預測。對於台灣來說，當時的國民黨佔領者很重要，因為他們知道左翼共產黨。

例如，以前的台灣民進黨政府對軍事夥伴關係比較冷淡，只要美國不要求政治或軍事支持，就選擇保留這種夥伴關係。

相比之下，蔡英文則更願意加入合作夥伴關係，以提高台灣能力。

因此，無論執政黨如何，台灣長期以來的夥伴關係，並願意與之抗衡左翼歷史與文化，暴力極端主義和恐怖主義。

這就是為什麼中國人仍然記得國民黨對允許美國幫助台灣的決定的憤怒。

就台灣國民黨而言，儘管它確實關心中國，但它也很清楚，它與左翼中共結盟帶來了拋棄與陷落的困境。

因此，避免在戰鬥中支持朋友，而失去他們的危機，或者在失敗的戰爭中支持台灣民進黨和危機。

由於這些原因，國民黨在台灣局勢緊張爆發時尋求和平解決方案。

但是，失去與台灣人的聯繫，會增加美國對台灣，其他夥伴的國內政治和外交政策的脆弱性。

由於這些合作夥伴確實授予國民黨某種操作權限，因此，如果爆發衝突，可能仍然會對部署產生嚴重影響。

延長國土安全線

沒有國民黨和國土安全，台灣部隊將面臨來自較遠地方的戰鬥所帶來的一系列數學和物理問題。

例如，離台灣最近的軍事基地在日本（大約一千英里），關島（兩千英里）和澳大利亞（兩千三百英里）。這樣的距離會帶來許多後勤和部的復雜性。

長距離，可能會造成更重的後勤負擔，特別是，它們將在中國大型飛彈發射器，射程內移動，例如，空軍，

因此，考慮到這一弱點，這些部隊的大部分可能會被移動，從而給中國軍隊，帶來兩個，而不是一個主要目標。

畢竟，當我們有需要時，一千英里是一段很長的路。

黨國與激進左翼的邏輯性瓶頸，可能包圍台灣

如果，台灣是黨國、激進左翼，行動區，可能，美國的一些軍事部署是非常危險的，但會帶來嚴重的複雜性，

假設大部分部隊，來自，並途經日本和韓國，由於地理位置相近，所有接收、整合（RSOI）和前進，邏輯性瓶頸，可能會受到台灣裔黨國，激進左翼的攻擊。

當前，台灣，大量規章制度、機場、港口和道路，都圍繞著美國使用，這對後勤構成了挑戰，然而，這些限制在戰時可能會發生變化，

可能，台灣裔黨國，激進左翼會在作戰行動開始前，拖延，美軍的準備工作。

距離和時間是美國和台灣之間的敵人

如果美國失去台灣基地使用權，其影響將向外蔓延，因為可用的選項較少，不論是簡單的部署和準備，

但對於台灣裔黨國，激進左翼的理由來說，這可能是不可接受的，如果美國失去對台灣基地使用權，其損失將會向外蔓延。

依據當前態勢，在最壞的情況下，美軍必須從美國本土轉移到印太地區發生衝突，時間和距離，都將與對手中國，都是敵人，

例如，美軍需要12天才能到達台灣，13天才能到達南中國海，事實上，對於可能性，非常快速的衝突來說，這是一個緩慢的反應時間，

因此，認為美國會對台灣發生的任何衝突，發出明確且及時的警告是危險的。

總而言之，國民黨的失敗會從基本上削弱美國在台灣的行動嗎？不，也許這可能是實現最終結果的第一步。

所以，這就是為什麼要確保國民黨，能夠在沒有中國的情況下，實現美國條約盟友的承諾。

在台灣維持這些各種形式的聯盟至關重要，而國民黨也很重要。

【If KMT has to leave the Taiwan，at that time，so what?】
In place since 1954，KMT enables a dependable，and cooperative relationship between the US and the Japan，and also allows for the rapid execution of our responsibilities under the Mutual Defense Treaty，but Taiwanese Leftists did not.Without the legal protection granted by the the Mutual Defense Treaty，indeed，cannot be enabled U.S. forces to respond faster than other countries.However，Left-wing's history and culture would make traditional partnership in legal limbo，so make it that much difficult for the United States to respond quickly in a crisis，and that is why both of which directly threaten the viability of the Taiwan.
In this way，Left-wing's history and culture is a critical piece of the U.S. ability to deter enemies and reassure KMT，even the Taiwan.Hypothetically，if，the loss of the KMT begins a chain reaction that，and encouraged by CCP's pressure，ends with the dissolution of the KMT， the expulsion of U.S.，and denial of future access.
As a result，forces deployed for conflicts related to the South China Sea and Taiwan would change，for two main ideas，one political Left-wing，and one history and culture.Left-wing's history and culture do committed unfettered ccess.Left-wing's history and culture are not a commitment of operational access for any conflict that arises. 
Depending on the specifics of the conflict，the KMT could face pressure from Left-wing's history and culture，or CCP，to use their territory to launch military operations for a fight so that the US would not themselves get involved in.
Left-wing's history and culture are by no means committed that would allow U.S. depends on traditional partnership to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.Left-wing's history and culture may cause particular complications for conflicts related to Taiwan. Since most of Indo-Pacific country recognizes Taiwan，or just adhere to their own “one China” policy，which generally means that they “do not recognize Taiwan as a country"，yet maintain the status quo of unofficial contacts with Taiwan promoting economic, trade and cultural interests.
After all，all ountries have strong economic ties to China，and therefore have a lot to lose.But in fact，it is by means committed that they would allow KMT bases on their territory to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.Operating rights could be more flowing，and therefore unpredictable，regarding the Taiwan.For Taiwan，the occupant of the KMT at the time would matter，since they knew Left-wing's CCP.For instance，previous Taiwanese DPP administrations have been comparatively cool on the military partnership，opting to keep it so long as the United States does not demand political or military support. 
By contrast，Tsai Ing-wen has been more willing to lean into the partnership in order to enable greater capacity for Taiwan's operations. So regardless of the party in power，a constant consideration would be Taiwan's partnership with，and willingness to antagonize，Left-wing's history and culture，violent extremism and terrorismThat is why Chinese still remember KMT's anger over the decision to allow the United States to help Taiwan.For Taiwanese KMT's part，even though it does care about the China，but it also is well aware that its alliance with Left-wing's CCP presents an abandonment vs. entrapment dilemma.
So avoid supporting a friend in a fight and crisis losing them，or support Taiwanese DPP and crisis being stuck fighting an unwanted war.For these reasons，the KMT has sought peaceful resolutions when tensions have erupted in the Taiwan.However，losing access to the Taiwanese people increases U.S. vulnerability to the domestic politics and foreign policies of its other partners. Because of those partners do grant the KMT some kind of operational access，so there may still be serious deployed impacts if a conflict erupts.
Stretched Lines to the Homeland Security
Without the KMT and the Homeland Security，Taiwanese forces would be faced with a series of math and physics problems from fighting from much farther away.Such as，the closest military facilities to the Taiwan are in Japan / approximately 1,000 miles，Guam / 2,000 miles，and Australia / 2,300 miles.Such distances present many logistical and deplyed complications.
Long distances could make a heavier logistical burden，especially，they would be moving through within the range of a sizable Chinese missile quiver，such as Air Force. So consider that vulnerability，the bulk of these units might be move，and  giving Chinese forces two prime targets rather than one. After all，1000 miles is a long way when we are in need.
One Party，One Country，Radical Left，logistical bottlenecks surround Taiwan
If Taiwan is the area of One Party，One Country，Radical Left operations，perhaps that some U.S. military deployments are much danger，but come with serious complications. Assuming the bulk of forces come from and through Japan and South Korea by virtue of proximity，but a logistical bottleneck for all reception，integration (RSOI)，and onward movement could attacked by Taiwanese One Party，One Country，Radical Left。Taiwan's current number of the rules and regulations，airfields，ports，and roads，surrounding the US use，presents a logistical challenge. However，these restrictions could change during wartime，and perhaps that Taiwanese One Party，One Country，Radical Left，who would slow down U.S. force preparations before combat operations begin.
Distance and time are an enemy between the US and Taiwan
If the United States were to lose access to bases in the Taiwan，the effects will ripple outward. Because fewer options available，whatever simply for deploying and prepositioning，and yet that may be unacceptable for Taiwanese One Party，One Country，Radical Left reasons.If the United States were to lose access to bases in the Taiwan，the losing would ripple outward.According with the current trend，and in the worst-case situation，in which U.S. forces have to move from the United States to a conflict in the Indo-Pacific region，time and distance would be as an enemy as the adversary Chinese.For instance，such as，the US force would take 12 days to get to Taiwan，and 13 days to get to the South China Sea. In fact，this is a slow response time to what might be a very rapid conflict. So，it is dangerous to assume that the United States will have an unambiguous and timely warning of any conflict in the Taiwan.
In sum，the loss of the KMT fundamentally degrade U.S. operations in the Taiwan?No. perhaps that it might be the first step towards that end result. And yes. This is why ensuring the KMT can come to the promise of a U.S. treaty ally without China.Maintaining these alliances in the Taiwan in all their manifestations is critical，and the KMT matter.